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Abstract 
New Labour‟s third White Paper promised the revitalization of local government after ten 
years of control freakery.  It does not, however, live up to the promise of a „new localism‟ 
(Stoker and Wilson, 2004).  The tenor of the paper is moralizing and prescriptive, claims to a 
new approach belied by the Government‟s negative response to Lyons.  Proposals for 
reform are ambiguous, offering no guarantees against back-door centralisation.  Such cause 
as there may be for optimism largely depends on the capacity of localities to take the 
initiative.  A fundamental debate about the role of local government, local democracy and 
the relationship between centre and locality is therefore still needed.  Given the 
preponderance of path dependencies, strategic dilemmas and structural constraints upon the 
centre, the demand for local democracy will have to be initiated, voiced and organised by 
local citizens and councillors themselves.
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Introduction 
 In 1997, New Labour proclaimed a new era for local government.  Recognising that it had 
been eviscerated by the Tories, the new government announced a central-local partnership 
and established an institution of that name under the 1997 „Framework for Partnership‟ 
agreement.1  The first White Paper (DETR, 1998), warning local government to rise to the 
challenge of modernisation, nevertheless adopted the tone of partnership.  It was welcomed 
by the Local Government Association as a move away from „a centralised and over-
prescriptive approach‟.2  Even Blair‟s notorious threat to sweep aside local authorities 
unwilling to „deliver the policies for which this government was elected‟ (1998: 22) did not 
quell optimism about the revival of local government.  Lowndes commented: „[i]n contrast 
to the Conservatives‟ attempted “managerialisation” of local politics, Labour sees local 
democracy as the normative raison d‟etre for local government‟.(2001: 1966).   
 
With the publication of a second White Paper (DTLR, 2001), however, the Secretary of State 
for Transport, Local Government and the Regions, Stephen Byers, effectively conceded that 
centralizing trends under the Conservatives had persisted.  He re-iterated the 1997 pledge to 
revive local government:   
 
I want to tackle the trend towards excessive central prescription and interference, 
which dominated central local relations in the 1980s and 90s. We are reversing that 
approach. The White Paper marks a pronounced step away from centralisation. It is 
about increased freedoms, better incentives, and a significant reduction in the 
number of controls, consent requirements, plans and over-elaborate guidance which 
                                                 
1 http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1133649.  Accessed 5th April 2007. 
2 http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/blg/lgcommentary.htm.  Accessed 5th April, 2007. 
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have been all too characteristic of the top-down approach to local government. It is 
truly about local government. It is a significant shift away from local administration.  
Based on a belief that we don't need to control everything, and a recognition that 
local authorities are often in the best position to respond to local needs and 
aspirations (DTLR, December 2001). 
 
Reviewing this second New Labour White Paper, however, Lowndes (2002: 136) detected 
not a „pronounced step away from centralisation‟, but a „new centralism‟; the intensification 
of managerialism at the expense of local democracy, artfully disguised in democratic 
language (2002: 144).  If anything, the government‟s second term turned out to be more 
centralizing than the first, with the growth of coercive performance management through 
the CPA and the seeming subordination of „community led‟ partnerships to ever closer audit 
and micro-management.  As Wright et al put it in a scathing evaluation of the flagship New 
Deal for Communities programme (2006: 347), „if NDC is a community-led programme, it is 
community led in the sense that government decides how the community will be involved, 
why they will be involved, what they will do and how they will do it‟.  This was the tenor of 
many commentaries about central-local relations in the period before New Labour‟s third 
White Paper (Copus, 2006; Davies, 2005; Geddes, 2006).   
   
Following David Miliband‟s brief tenure, Ruth Kelly‟s White Paper proclaimed a third new 
dawn for localism.  The new localist motto, „mobilising self-sustaining systems of 
improvement‟, reflects a growing recognition that the centre cannot micro-manage public 
services (Benington, 2006: 11).  Kelly‟s preface argues, in the same vein as Byers, that 
improvements in public services over the past 10 years have been „driven largely from the 
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centre‟, but that this approach cannot continue: „we must have the courage at the centre to 
let go‟ because the challenges facing the country are too complex for „all solutions to be 
imposed from the centre‟ (DCLG, 2006: 4).   
 
Complementing the localist mood, the final report of the Lyons Inquiry into local 
government was published on 21st March 2007.  The Inquiry was established in July 2004 to 
examine changes in the local government system, the reform of council tax and additional 
revenue raising powers.  It was extended in September 2005 to consider the fundamental 
role and function of local government.  It was briefly extended again in December 2006 to 
encompass the implications of other inquiries on planning, skills and transport.  Lyons, 
published five months after the White Paper, re-enforced the localist message accentuating 
the „place-shaping role of local authorities and calling for less central control; ideas hinging 
on financial reforms such as the de-nationalization of the business rate and the extension of 
council tax bandings.   But Lyons sounded a cautionary note (2007: i): 
 
No one should underestimate the sustained effort which will be required to achieve a 
real shift in the balance of influence between centre and locality. The history of the 
last 30 years is marked by a series of well-intentioned devolution initiatives, which 
have often evolved into subtle instruments of control. But it is an effort worth 
making. 
 
To what extent, then, does the White Paper signal a retreat from what Travers (30.3.2007) 
calls the „powerful and ruthlessly centralized government‟ tradition?  And can local 
government grasp such opportunity as the current climate affords to carve out a new, 
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vibrant and perhaps even dissenting political role?  Or will a fourth New Labour white paper 
again begin with an apology for the control-freakery of the third term?  The prognosis 
offered here is that with change at the margin, the white paper signifies continuity with the 
approach of the past decade. The devolutionary promise remains unfulfilled.   The paper 
concludes with three potential explanations for this failure, arguing that the outlook for 
devolution from the centre is poor.  Any future revitalization of local government will 
depend in the first instance on local actors of various hues exploiting opportunities and 
creating a permissive environment from the bottom up. 
 
The devolutionary climate 
Evaluating the White Paper demands a clear sense of what the purpose of local government 
should be.  On a continuum of strong-weak local government, Nicholas Ridley‟s „enabling‟ 
role is at one end with local authorities meeting only to award service contracts (Coulson, 
2004: 471).  At the other end is radical localism entailing the constitutional separation of 
powers.  Here, local government would have a wide remit to determine the means and ends 
of governing, powers which would themselves act as a check on the centre.  Much of the 
local government literature sits between these extremes. Walker (2002) errs on the side of 
centralism, claiming that strong government serves the cause of equity, but most leading 
commentators (Lowndes and Wilson, 2003; Stewart, 2003; Stoker and Wilson, 2004; 
Pratchett and Leach, 2004; and Copus, 2006) err to a greater or lesser extent toward the case 
for enhanced localism.   The balance of opinion is that the devolution of political power to 
local government and localities is long overdue; not only because centralisation is inefficient 
but also because it damages democracy.   According to the Power Inquiry, discussing 
Britain‟s democratic deficit, thousands of ordinary people  
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… feel quietly angry or depressed. When it comes to politics they feel they are eating 
stones. Principle and ideas seem to have been replaced with managerialism and 
public relations. It is as though Proctor and Gamble or Abbey National are running 
the country‟ (The Power Inquiry, 2006: foreword, 9).   
 
For Power, the „overwhelmingly dominant‟ position of central government is a key part of 
the explanation for such alienation.  „One of the strongest aspects of the evidence received 
by the Inquiry is the extent to which the dilution of the powers of local government has had 
a major impact on engagement with formal democracy‟.  Consequently, Power recommends 
that: „[t]here should be an unambiguous process of decentralisation of powers from central 
to local government‟; there should be a „concordat … drawn up between central and local 
government setting out their respective powers‟, local government should have enhanced 
powers to raise taxes and „administer its own finances‟ and „democracy hubs‟ should be 
established to help citizens navigate the local democratic system (The Power Inquiry, 2006: 
22-25).   
 
Sensitive to this mood and recognising in recent years that centralization does not necessarily 
secure control (Davies, 2005, 2007), the government has renewed its devolutionary rhetoric, 
drawing on the language of new localism, double-devolution (briefly during David 
Miliband‟s tenure at ODPM) and Lyons‟ place-shaping agenda.  Against this backdrop, the 
White Paper, the Local government and public involvement in health bill and the Government‟s 
response to Lyons should be judged primarily against devolutionary criteria; have the 
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political powers and capabilities of local authorities been enhanced and does the centre 
shows any sign of abandoning the deeply embedded culture of control-freakery?    
 
All change but no change 
Set against robust devolutionary criteria, the government‟s proposals and its reaction to 
Lyons are very disappointing, following the trajectory evident since notions of „constrained 
discretion‟ and „earned autonomy‟ became fashionable during the government‟s second term 
(Pratchett, 2004). There has been no paradigm shift in central-local relations and this White 
Paper does not signify a political renaissance for local government or indeed for „localism‟, 
defined as community led governance (Stoker, 2004, 2005).   
 
The document is suffused in the breathless „change‟ narrative characteristic of the 
Government‟s globalization mania, interpolated with exhortations on the majority of local 
authorities to catch up with „the best‟, who are „already‟ doing it in response to what the 
government has „already‟ done.  During the last decade „the world has moved on apace. The 
speed of change, often driven by global forces, can be startling …‟ (DCLG, 2006: 154).  Or, 
„…such is the pace of change that we cannot afford to be complacent‟ (2006: 25).  In 
response, „the best‟ local authorities are „already‟ delivering transformed services, but „we 
need to increase the pace of change‟ (2006: 26).  Under the new inspection regime, 
comprehensive area assessment, local authorities will be judged on the „pace of 
improvement‟ (2006: 126).  The trade-off for any reduction in national targets is that „the 
pace of public service improvements will quicken‟ (2006: 117).  Thus, the world is changing, 
people are changing and local government needs to change, emulating „the best‟ in the 
sector, which is „already‟ changing but must nevertheless change again and change 
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continuously.  The word „change‟ appears 105 times in Kelly‟s White Paper, 75 times in 
Modern Local Government (DETR, 1998) and a mere 30 in Strong Local Leadership (DTLR, 2001).  
After three white papers and ten years of New Labour reform, change in local government 
seems more urgent than ever and the message is clear.  The government may now expect 
„improvement‟ to be driven locally, but frantic (supposedly „sustainable‟) „change‟ is non-
negotiable.  Moreover, the direction of change is heavily prescribed.  Services must be 
increasingly „personalized‟ in an ever wider „partnership‟ with the private sector. Councils  
 
…will have to challenge traditional methods of delivery, root out waste, keep all 
council activity under review and work with other public bodies to share assets, 
systems, data, skills and knowledge more effectively. … Ambitious efficiency gains 
will therefore be required as part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review‟ 
(DCLG, 2006: 12).   
 
This proselytizing style sets in stone the political agenda for local government. It offers no 
space for dissidence, the central measure of political freedom.  Any local authority basing its 
„place-making‟ strategy on the belief that continuous change is damaging and unsustainable, 
that the incursion of the market into public services has been disastrous, or that the 
government‟s efficiency drive has emasculated the public sphere (Marquand, 2004) can 
expect „directive action‟ and the „removal of functions‟ (DCLG, 2006: 130-131).   
 
But this frenetic change narrative is a stark contrast with the glacial pace of change in central 
government itself.  Having twice extended the Lyons review, the government buried the 
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launch of Sir Michael‟s report on budget day, 21st March 2007, along with his key 
recommendations.  According to the Guardian (Leader, 22.3.2007):  
 
Already ministerial sources have been briefing that they prefer to „let sleeping dogs 
lie‟ rather than make any bold reforms. Sir Michael‟s suggestions are hardly 
audacious, but even they are likely to be buried. Yet this report was commissioned by 
a government that has long championed localism and the need for greater local 
autonomy. In practice, it appears unwilling to muster the political courage to do 
anything about it. 
  
Responding to Lyons at the post-report conference, Local Government Minister Phil 
Woolas (28.3.2007) duly delivered the government‟s rebuff.  Cautiously progressive 
proposals to extend council tax bandings upward above band H and downward below band 
A were dismissed along with the long awaited Council Tax property revaluation.  Lyons‟ 
recommendation for the de-nationalization of the business rate was also rejected.  He noted 
that since the national business rates system was introduced, the proportion of local 
government revenues funded by business has fallen from 29% to 20% in 2006-7 (2007: 28).  
The Guardian (Leader, 22.3.2007) claimed that if the business contribution were to rise to its 
1990 level it would take £250 on average out of Council Tax bills.  Woolas conceded that the 
proposed local supplementary levy on business rates might be a good idea „subject to wide 
acceptability among rate payers‟.  But he dismissed the recommendation that capping should 
be abolished, arguing that government „does not consider that its powers to cap council tax 
increases necessarily need to be seen as weakening the freedom and accountability of local 
government to its electorate‟ (DCLG, 21.3.2007).   
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Woolas sugared these snubs by claiming agreement with what he took to be Lyons‟ 
overarching message; „… the government agrees that council tax is not broken … we agree 
with Sir Michael‟s conclusion that business rates are a successful and stable property tax 
…while I agree that business rates are a successful and stable tax … ‟.   He thus claims that 
the report is in synch with the government‟s agenda, while rejecting every significant 
proposal; a textbook example of political spin. 
 
Commenting on the Government‟s response to Lyons, Travers lamented its „comprehensive 
lack of nerve‟ (30.3.2007), arguing that the freedom for local authorities to raise resources 
and determine their use is of constitutional importance.  Addressing the CBI a few weeks 
later, however, Woolas insisted that speculation about the inability of central government to 
„deliver its side of the bargain‟ was ill founded (DCLG, 14.5.2007).  He reiterated that the 
government‟s „whole agenda‟ is about local authorities and partners „stepping forward‟.  But 
he reiterated the status quo on capping, arguing that while the Council Tax is primarily the 
remit of local authorities, „they need to exercise this responsibly‟ (Woolas, 4.5.2007).3  Used 
or not, capping remains a powerful emblem of the centralizing tradition and perhaps the 
most potent symbol of continuity with the Thatcher era and the evisceration of local 
government.  Until government relinquishes its veto over local taxation, claims that it is 
willing to „let go‟ must be viewed with profound skepticism.  With Lyons‟ modest proposals 
blocked, the system of finance upon which the power of any government depends will 
remain fundamentally unchanged well into any fourth New Labour term.  And, judging by 
                                                 
3 Woolas, 4.5.2007 accessed from 
http://www.publicfinance.co.uk/search_details.cfm?News_id=30489&keysearch=woolas on 29th May 2007.  
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the attitude of the Conservative party to taxation little will change under a government led 
by David Cameron.   
 
But what of the specific proposals in the White Paper, making their way through Parliament 
in the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill (House of Commons, 2006)?  Here, 
the picture is one of continuing political control freakery combined with greater managerial 
flexibility.  But there is also ambiguity and perhaps space for localities to interpret certain 
proposals in more or less radical ways, but always within the constraints of a local governing 
agenda determined nationally.  
 
Local authorities as place-shapers 
Lyons argues that place-shaping entails a „wider strategic role for local government‟ making 
„creative use of powers and influence to promote the general well-being of a community and 
its citizens‟ (2007: 3).4  The White Paper enthusiastically takes up place-shaping as the 
guiding principle for reform and the government set out the guiding principles of reform in 
its explanation of the Bill: 
 
It introduces measures designed to: (1) empower communities, such as  devolving 
power to create parishes (and other forms of community governance) to principal 
authorities, and introducing a community call for action; (2) make local government 
more effective and accountable through, for example, revised leadership and 
electoral arrangements, provision for restructuring in two-tier areas and a move to a 
                                                 
4  The Centre for Cities (14.3.2006) argues that „place-shaping‟ should be defined as the power to tailor funding 
streams to local purposes, a commitment to asymmetric devolution depending on the character of a locality,  
recognition that place is not constrained by local authority boundaries, devolved spending powers, access to 
new revenue sources and greater policy autonomy.   
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more locally-based standards regime; (3) strengthen the community leadership role of 
councils; and (4) simplify the performance framework and reduce the burden of 
inspection on councils (House of Commons, 2007: 1). 
 
The discussion now turns to the government‟s proposals in relation to each of these themes.  
 
Empowering communities 
The Community Call for Action (CCfA) was one of the eagerly anticipated proposals in the 
White Paper.  Originally conceived as a mechanism to make local authorities more 
responsive to public demands, it would be more accurate in its current guise to call it the 
„Councillor Call for Action‟.  The Bill packages it as a mechanism enabling councillors to 
make representations on behalf of their communities – a filtering mechanism designed to 
screen out frivolous and unrealistic demands from the public and the „usual suspects‟.  The 
CCfA is seen as an „avenue of last resort rather than a mainstream way of doing business‟ 
(House of Commons, 2007: 54).  The Bill „mainstreams‟ the CCfA model established for 
crime and disorder.  Under this system, councillors will be expected to be the eyes and ears 
of their communities.  As the White Paper put it, the public will receive „more information 
about service standards and be able to turn to their local councillor‟ and „demand an answer 
to their questions‟ (DCLG, 2006: 8).   In the first instance, councillors are expected to raise 
issues (pertaining only to their wards, not the council as a whole) with relevant cabinet 
members and officers.  If unsatisfied, they can refer the issue to overview and scrutiny 
committees (DCLG, 2006: 37).  Committees obliged to consider the matter „may‟ then make 
recommendations and, under enhancements to the overview and scrutiny process discussed 
below, „relevant public bodies would be required to respond to the committee‟s 
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recommendations …They could respond positively or negatively, but their responses will be 
publicised‟ (House of Commons, 2007: 55).   
 
The White Paper also encourages local authorities to delegate „small budgets‟ to Councillors 
to deal with problems that might otherwise escalate through the CCfA (DCLG, 2006: 5).  
This process gives backbench councillors a little additional spending power.  But 
„community empowerment‟ is a misnomer for a process only to be used infrequently, 
initiated by councillors and which may or may not lead to action – with overview and 
scrutiny committees acting as „gatekeepers‟ not tribunes (House of Commons, 2007: 58).   
 
Nevertheless, the CCfA is ambiguous and there is scope for interpretation.   The tenor of 
the White Paper is that it should be a mechanism for consumers of public services to send 
market signals to councils.  But it need not be so limited.  Councillors could, if minded, use it 
as a vehicle to initiate public debate, for example about the merits and de-merits of 
privatizing housing stock or the problem of rising inequalities and child poverty.  Rather 
than merely conveying an aggregate of public opinions, it could be a mechanism for 
enhanced public discourse, led by local councillors.  The „community call for action‟ could 
even be institutionalized as a deliberative forum at the ward level, or below.  Certainly, there 
is nothing in the legislation to prohibit this.  This suggestion chimes both with Power‟s 
suggestion for „democracy hubs‟ and the sharp distinction drawn by the Inquiry between 
responsiveness to consumers and democracy: 
 
… individual decisions made on behalf of oneself and one‟s family cannot substitute 
for mass deliberation in the public realm – which is an absolutely crucial process in a 
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democratic and open society.  We have different views individually on the rights or 
wrongs of greater user choice . Indeed, such deliberation often arises from the need 
to develop a policy response to the aggregated consequences of individual choices. It 
cannot be assumed that a „do what works‟ policy for local government and public 
services will necessarily guarantee democracy and engagement (The Power Inquiry, 
2006: 159).  
 
Lyons writes of a „pressing need to inspire a sense of powerfulness in local government‟ 
(2007: ii).  Councillors taking up Power‟s challenge would seek to ensure that the CCfA 
becomes a vehicle for reviving local politics and not a consumerist damp squib.   This 
argument applies in equal measure to other initiatives including Local Involvement 
Networks for public engagement in the NHS and social services, to be established under 
local authority management.  Parishes eligible for „quality parish‟ status under an 
accreditation scheme run by the National Association of Local Councils (DCLG, 2006: 43) 
will be awarded the power of well-being and local authorities will be delegated the power to 
create parishes (2006: 8).  This power to create parishes may also create space for local 
authorities to inspire new democratic practices at the sub-local level.  However, it is unclear 
of what value the „power of wellbeing‟ will be to „quality parishes‟ without the requisite 
resources to act, or indeed why in a devolutionary climate it should not be given to all 
parishes, „quality‟ or not (House of Commons, 2007: 41).    
 
The government is also proposing a „best value‟ duty on local authorities to „secure local 
participation in service design and delivery‟ (House of Commons, 2007: 62), entailing steps 
to inform citizens about service performance, consult them on the shape of services and 
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involve them in service design, delivery and assessment (2007: 64).  These duties might be 
carried out in the technocratic „what works‟ spirit lamented by Power, or in the spirit of 
reflective critique, where the purpose, goals, design and delivery of public services are all 
open to debate.  Therefore, only time will tell what these reforms amount to as a vehicle for 
the revival of political localism and whether, for example, they conform to the principles of 
associational democracy advocated by Stoker and Wilson (2004: 252-263).   
 
Effectiveness and performance 
If the community empowerment credentials of the White Paper are tenuous and to some 
extent up for grabs, how far is the government prepared to loosen the strings in the 
performance management arena?  The implications of some proposals are not entirely clear, 
but overall the impression is that localities may have a little more managerial discretion with 
the putative reduction of targets, financial flexibility and the streamlining of the inspection 
regime, henceforth to be called „comprehensive area assessment‟.   
 
The need for a reduction in government supervision is a major theme for Lyons‟ place-
shaping agenda.  He argues that the „weight of central controls‟ can lead to local choice being 
„crowded out‟ and to the misallocation of resources away from local priorities thereby 
reducing public satisfaction.  „It can also crowd out place-shaping, reducing the role of local 
government to a set of silo-based service activities‟, „stifling innovation‟ (2007: 5).   Woolas‟s 
(28.3.2007) response conceded that the number of central targets and directions limit „local 
government‟s accountability to citizens and its ability to work creatively, flexibly and with 
innovation‟.   
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The government proposes several reforms to enhance managerial flexibility.  The Bill 
removes the duty on local authorities to write best value performance plans and carry out 
best value reviews (House of Commons, 2007: 65).  The White Paper commits the 
government to a „massive‟ reduction in the number of targets imposed on localities (DCLG, 
2006: 2).  It is vague about how many targets localities currently report on, estimating 600 to 
1200 (2006: 122) but acknowledges that 80% of local government reporting is to the centre 
and only 20% to citizens (2006: 117).  The government pledged to reduce reporting by 
establishing a single set of „about 200 national outcome indicators covering everything from 
climate change to teenage pregnancy‟ (2006: 20), which it has done by publishing a single set 
of 198 (DCLG, October 2007).  Local Area Agreements (LAAs), delivery partnerships 
between central government, local government and local stakeholders, will contain around 
35 additional priorities for „improvement locally‟ (House of Commons, 2007: 13).  But, these 
35 priorities must relate to the national indicator set although others may be set by local 
authorities in partnership with their stakeholders.  The sting in the tail is that the Bill 
includes a power of „designation‟; the power for the Secretary of State to take any target set 
locally and make it compulsory, provided that this is done within one month of approving 
the draft LAA (House of Commons, 2006: 55).  Canny local authorities might take this as a 
cue not to set any targets over and above the required 35.  However, the Secretary of State 
retains the power not only to designate targets, but to require local authorities to submit 
revised LAA proposals, seemingly at any time (2006: 56-7).   
 
It therefore remains to be seen whether a smaller number of national indicators might not 
turn out to be more encompassing, or indeed whether new targets might not be re-imposed 
by the back door through the designation system.  Lyons comments that new central 
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government priorities, emerging between agreements, should be incorporated on a „strictly 
“one in, one out” basis in order to avoid gradual re-growth of central control‟ (2007: 11).  
But, the fact that the Bill proposes no statutory limit on the number of targets, suggests that 
government is keeping its options open.  Here, vagueness is unlikely to work in favour of 
devolution and the Bill does not inspire confidence.  It remains unclear to what extent the 
government will deliver its side of the bargain.   
 
The White Paper also proposed a new system of inspection called „comprehensive area 
assessment‟.   This, it argued, will be a more „proportionate risk-based regime which will cut 
bureaucracy and allow more targeted support or intervention when things go wrong‟ 
(DCLG, 2006: 2).  There is no mention of CAA in the Bill, but the White Paper states that it 
will be introduced in 2009 and anticipates that it will lead to the reduction of inspectorate 
funding by one third, implying a reduction in inspection (2006: 125).  Local authorities will 
be assessed against an annual risk judgment, scored „direction of travel‟ and „use of 
resources‟ judgments and judgment from any inspection activity triggered by the risk 
assessment (2006: 126).  The White Paper sets out mechanisms available to the secretary of 
state in the event of „under-performance‟ including: targeted inspections triggered by 
negative risk assessments, improvement notices, „directive action‟ and ultimately, where 
direction fails to secure improvement, the „removal of functions‟ (2006: 130-1).  Existing 
proposals offer no guarantee that the new system will not end up instituting even more 
demanding inspections, particularly if local government does not live up to the express 
change and improvement agenda.  Given past experience and the persistence of a strong 
centralising culture, the risk is that if good intentions are not codified they will not be put 
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into practice. If they are codified and implemented, they may be eroded.  Proposals for 
enhanced local leadership and partnership working amplify these concerns.   
 
Strengthening local leadership and partnership working 
There are four major areas where government is proposing to enhance local leadership and 
partnership working with a view to strengthening the „place-shaping‟ role of local authorities: 
local area agreements, overview and scrutiny, political governance arrangements and unitary 
local government.  Each merits discussion.  
 
While concerns persist about national targets, local authorities are to be given an enhanced 
place-shaping role through LAAs.  Top-tier authorities will be duty bound to prepare an 
agreement in consultation with government and other named stakeholders, including public 
agencies required to cooperate with them in setting targets and to „have regard for every local 
improvement target when exercising its functions‟ (House of Commons, 2007: 50).  
Overview and scrutiny committees will be empowered to examine the performance of 
partners delivering LAA targets and to make recommendations, which service providers 
must „have regard‟ to, provided they relate to that partner‟s commitments (DCLG, 2006: 59).   
 
Government sees the LAA as pivotal to the „new deal with local government‟, enhancing the 
local strategic leadership role and financial flexibility (DCLG, 14.5.2007).  Again, however, 
the proposals are ambiguous.  Local government has no power to enforce the duty to 
cooperate and, as the New Local Government Network comments, the test will be what 
happens when agencies set diverging priorities or goals, or are bound by incongruent targets 
(see House of Commons, 2007: 51).   Moreover, an agency required to „have regard‟ for a 
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target or recommendation is obliged merely to consider it and may then dismiss it.  If it does 
not consider it, local authorities have no powers of enforcement; these still rest with the 
centre which, as noted above, may set and designate any target it wants.   
 
A recent DCLG report (October, 2006) on early LAA pilots found evidence of an increase 
in shared priorities with partners thinking more „holistically‟, generating improvements in 
performance management and budgeting - although this had not translated into efficiency 
gains.  However, it also found variable enthusiasm for LAAs among central government 
departments.  Some were supportive and others worried about the effects of light touch 
control on their ability to deliver via localities.  Localities also reported difficulties in 
obtaining flexibility from the centre. Civil servants in turn acknowledged „how hard it has 
been to achieve change at the centre‟ (October, 2006: 11).  It therefore remains questionable 
how far the new system of targets and duties on partners will enhance the place-shaping 
capabilities of local authorities.  Much depends on the centre being capable of letting go.     
  
Similar place-shaping powers are proposed for local authorities through the overview and 
scrutiny process. Introduced in 2000, overview and scrutiny was designed for backbench 
councillors to hold the Executive to account (Ashworth and Snape, 2004).  The White Paper 
proposes enhanced powers for local government to scrutinize other agencies.  As noted 
above, scrutiny committees will be empowered to report and make recommendations on 
CCfA referrals and on the performance of partners against LAA targets, to which partner 
agencies are once again required to „have regard‟.  In pursuit of either function, they will be 
able to require public service providers to supply information to the committee within 20 
days, „insofar as their actions relate to functions or service delivery connected with the 
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authority‟ (House of Commons, 2007: 53).  Councils will be required to consider and publish 
their response to overview and scrutiny recommendations within two months, giving notice 
of action „if any‟ to be taken (2007: 56).   
 
At best, this new system will add weight to the influence of backbench councillors vis a vis 
the Executive and to the local authority vis a vis its partners.  But it adds nothing to „hard‟ 
power, the local democratic control of public action, in either case.  Again, enforcement 
remains the prerogative of the Centre.  The effectiveness of these proposals will therefore 
depend more on how much tacit authority the scrutiny system gradually accumulates than on 
formal powers.  Worryingly, the passages in the Bill which deal with overview and scrutiny 
re-enforce the micro-management culture.  There are several places where matters better left 
to common sense are to be codified.  In relation to the CCfA the scrutiny committee „must 
provide the member with a copy of any report or recommendations which it makes to the 
authority or the executive under section 21(2) in relation to the matter‟ (House of Commons, 
2006: 60).  It must replace exempt or confidential sections of reports if not doing so makes 
them „misleading‟ or not „reasonably comprehensible‟ (2006: 64).  Such micro-prescriptions 
are wholly contrary to the philosophy of „letting go‟. They maybe the responsibility of 
drafting civil servants rather than Ministers, but if so this merely emphasises the vast culture 
change required at the centre if devolutionary promises are to be kept.     
 
The discussion of LAAs and overview and scrutiny shows that new initiatives are ambiguous 
and their effect on the place-shaping role of local authorities is hard to predict.  But the 
measures proposed for political governance arrangements and the restructuring of local 
government are more overtly authoritarian, reinforcing the need for caution about 
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uncodified powers.  There are 13 elected Mayors in the UK, including the Mayor of London.   
Under the new proposals, local authorities will choose from the indirectly elected leader and 
cabinet model, a directly elected Mayor or a new directly elected executive, with the Mayor 
and Council Manager model (adopted only by Stoke on Trent) abolished.   In each case, the 
Leader or Mayor will be presumed to serve a 4 year term of office.   
 
The most controversial proposal is to abolish the requirement for a local referendum to 
approve either of the direct election models, although residents will still be able to petition 
for an elected Mayor.  This measure strengthens local political leaders. But it remains 
vulnerable to the old criticism that it will lead to the concentration of power and to a new 
one, that communities maybe robbed of the power to decide (within limits) how they will be 
governed; the local authority „may‟ still choose to hold a referendum, but otherwise they will 
only be „consulted‟.  Moreover, once direct elections are adopted, there is to be a 
„presumption‟ against any move back to the leader and cabinet model (DCLG, 2006: 27), 
stripping councils of the freedom they currently enjoy to change the system if they wish.  
Roy Hattersley commented:   
 
If a local authority wants to hand over its responsibilities to one individual supported 
by anonymous councillors with emasculated powers, it is now free to do so. Too 
many referendums produce the wrong result. That decision was, we must hope, the 
death throes of New Labour's novel definition of local democracy - the right of the 
people to choose as long as they make the choice that the government wants (cited 
in House of Commons, 2007: 35-6).  
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The terminology in the Bill gives further cause for alarm.  Local authorities are told to 
„consider the extent to which the proposals, if implemented, would be likely to assist in 
securing continuous improvement in the way in which the local authority‟s functions are 
exercised, having regard to a combination of economy, efficiency and effectiveness‟ (House 
of Commons, 2006: 25).  This technocratic restraint has no place in enabling legislation and 
it once again evokes the „Procter and Gamble‟ approach to government disparaged by 
Power.  The words „democracy‟ and „empower‟ feature not once in the Bill, whereas 
„efficient‟ or „efficiency features 10 times „manage‟ 18, „improve‟ or „improvement‟ 31 and 
„perform‟ 41 times.  By comparison, the White Paper mentions „democracy‟ 18 times, 
„empower‟ 37, „perform‟ 200, „transform‟ 210 and „improve‟ 250 times.  One does not have 
to think that this narrative imbalance tells the whole story to fear that technocratic centralism 
remains deeply embedded in the political culture of the UK Government.  
  
The government, finally, has indicated that it is well disposed toward unitary local 
government, suggesting that unitary authorities are more effective, accountable and 
responsive; this despite Lyons‟ cautionary note that past experiences of reorganization are a 
warning about „the risks of poorly developed or executed change, and shows that it is by no 
means a panacea‟ (2007: 11).  He goes on to argue that two-tier local government has 
advantages, suggesting that the main challenge is not restructuring but closer working 
between the tiers (2007: 18).   The White Paper, with dramatic understatement, says that 
local authorities in two-tier areas will „be able‟ to move to unitary status (DCLG, 2006: 17).  
The reality is that the government proposes to assume powers to „invite or direct local 
authorities to make proposals for establishing unitary authorities in two-tier areas, and to 
implement such proposals‟ (House of Commons, 2007: 3), albeit for a limited period until 
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25th January 2008 (House of Lords, 2007: 3).  Aware of the chaos unleashed by Banham 
(Leach and Stoker, 1997) and of the vested interests in counties and districts, the 
Government may well be unwilling to leave the cases it views as important to chance.   
 
But, as Lyons suggests, the premise that unitary authorities necessarily lead to stronger, more 
efficient local government, and therefore better place-shapers, is flawed.  Copus equates the 
quest for optimum size with the search for the philosopher‟s stone, arguing that larger 
authorities and city-regions (about which the White Paper says much, the Bill nothing) will 
lead to „larger, more remote and technocratically driven units of local government‟ (2006: 4).  
The government‟s predisposition toward unitary local government adds to the sense that it 
may quickly revert to route-one centralism.  Whatever the merits of unitary local 
government, the current Bill undercuts the devolutionary premise of the White Paper and 
the rhetoric of „double devolution‟, now buried, which preceded it.  It undermines the rights 
of councils and communities to a say in how they govern, or are governed.   
 
Explaining the inertia in central-local relations 
One does not have to be a radical localist to be frustrated at the Government‟s failure to 
begin rebalancing the hugely lopsided relationship between centre and locality.  The 
dismissal of Lyons, the moralizing tone of the white paper, the ambiguity of proposals that 
are only cautiously devolutionary at best and the power grab with respect to reorganization 
do nothing to dispel the impression that New Labour remains as guilty of „elite contempt‟ 
for local government (Stewart, 2000: 95-6) as predecessors going back to John Stuart Mill 
(Chandler, forthcoming).  A credible, if not overwhelming, case for centralism can be made 
in terms of public accountability (Stoker, 2004: 190-191), economy of scale (Walker, 2002) or 
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equalization as in the case of business rates (DCLG, 14.5.2007).  But in the context of 
devolutionary rhetoric, continuing control freakery seems like double-dealing.   Why, then, 
does centralisation persist, despite the repeated devolutionary promises of the Blair years?   
 
One explanation hinted at in the above discussion is path dependency (Lowndes, 2001; 
Davies, 2004).  Lyons (2007: i) questions the capacity of government to break from the age 
old culture of central control, including „elite contempt‟, deeply embedded in the institutions 
and practices of Whitehall.  Conversely and for the same reasons, local government has 
become deeply attuned to subaltern status, what Woolas calls „the dependency culture … a 
legacy of the centralizing measures imposed from Whitehall‟ (4.5.2007).  Central government 
maybe reluctant to devolve power but if it did, local government maybe unable to grasp it.  
Historical constraints of this kind demand what Crouch (2005) calls „institutional 
entrepreneurs‟ to break the logjam, navigating and subverting rules and conventions, 
rendering them untenable or redundant.  The Community Call for Action and scrutiny 
processes are arenas in which local activism of this kind might be practiced.  
 
Another structural explanation lies in the complex relationship between market economies 
and states.  The basic principle of market friendly or neo-liberal governance is that market 
dynamism should be unleashed and governed only by entrepreneurial, minimal states.  
Jessop (2002: 454), however, notes that market deregulation in countries like the UK has 
resulted in a „paradoxical‟ increase in state intervention.  Apologists, he says, claim that after 
a brief transitional period, the state will retreat to a light-touch supervisory role.  Jessop 
rejects this argument asserting that the strong state is in reality the pre-condition of a „free‟ 
economy (Gamble, 1994).  Karl Polanyi argued, for example, that „free‟ markets are a 
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„utopian chimera‟.    He identified an irreconcilable contradiction in market capitalism (cited 
in Marquand, 2004: 42): 
 
Thus even those who wished most ardently to free the state from all unnecessary 
duties, and whose whole philosophy demanded the restriction of state activities, 
could not but entrust the self-same state with the new powers, organs, and 
instruments required for the establishment of laissez-faire. 
 
But why should centralisation be an inevitable by-product of marketisation?  Firstly, 
liberalizing governments are faced with having to overcome the legacy of post-war 
„welfarism‟, still embedded in public and professional attitudes (Park et al, 2007).  
Technocratic managerialism is in part a strategic response to this challenge.  Secondly, they 
have to manage the polarizing and exclusionary impact of deregulation, marked for example 
by the recent rise in the Gini coefficient measuring income inequality to its highest level 
since WW2 (Brewer et al, 2006) and concomitant upward pressure on public expenditure.  
Thirdly, neoliberal doctrines demand that more be done by the state with fewer resources, 
placing downward pressure on public expenditure and requiring robust performance 
management from government to deter free riders.  These factors require the state 
constantly to intervene, demanding „change‟ to manage emerging challenges and 
simultaneously clamp down on costs.  These features make authoritarianism an integral 
component of liberalisation strategies.  The co-dependence of „free economy and strong 
state‟ (Gamble, 1994) maybe philosophically untenable, but it nevertheless affords a 
powerful explanation for the inability, or unwillingness of the centre to „let go‟.  At the coal 
face of the welfare state, local authorities have been caught up in this centralising dynamic.  
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Seen this way, centralisation is a corollary of New Labour politics, occurring because rather 
than in spite of the government‟s approach.  The implication is that autonomous and 
democratic local government is incompatible with free market paradigms and might only be 
instituted in a transformed political economy.   
 
At a more mundane level, an explanation can be found in the strategic dilemmas integral to 
governing.  Jessop (2000) argues that governance failure is inevitable, given that in a diverse 
polity, governments are obliged to pursue incompatible goals.  All governments face 
irreconcilable demands.  If New Labour devolves real political power to local authorities, it 
will result in geographically differentiated governing objectives, mechanisms, standards and 
performance.  Yet, the public demands that government guarantees equity and national 
standards and holds it responsible for failure in public services, meaning that discretion is 
possible only at the margins – or in areas of activity not directly related to public service 
provision (Stoker, 2004: 190-1).  If the latter objective is prioritised, devolution is bound to 
be cautious, limited and incremental – if it happens at all.   
 
These explanations are not exclusive and all may have some purchase on reality, suggesting 
as they do that the current period is unfavourable to the revival of localism from the top-
down.  Notwithstanding that some minsters and civil servants believe they should devolve 
power, they face serious constraints and dilemmas.  Heavily constrained discretion therefore 
remains the order of the day and the primary role of the local authority is to deliver the 
national political agenda.  If this analysis is borne out, and unless the Government has a 
change of heart before the Bill gains Royal Assent, a fourth New Labour White Paper will 
indeed need to explain the centralising trends of the third term. 
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Conclusion 
If the premise that strong localism is the condition of a vibrant, healthy democracy is right, 
but present circumstances are unpropitious, what can be done to bring about the long-
heralded, never-attained renaissance?  Chandler (forthcoming) argues that localists must 
develop a clear ethical justification for local government, premised on the idea that „as 
individuals should be free to follow their beliefs, provided these do not harm others, then 
communities with self regarding interests should also be free to pursue their ideas‟.  He 
concludes that a strong ethical justification of this kind could „establish a much clearer 
rationale for determining the structure and functions of differing tiers of community within 
and including the state‟ (forthcoming, 34).  Chandler‟s contribution is timely and a debate on 
the terms he suggests could be provocative and productive.  But, once the ethical basis for 
strong local government or governance is established, formal and informal institutional 
mechanisms will be needed to seal the agreed division of labour and protect localities against 
creeping centralism.  For Copus (2006), the culture and traditions of centralism in UK 
government will not be overcome without a new constitutional settlement, enshrining the 
rights and powers of local government.  To this end, his model of a federalized UK based on 
strong local government is thought provoking.  But even written constitutions can be 
thwarted in the day to day exercise power, meanings challenged and changing over time.   
 
Where, then might the impetus for reform might come from?  Given the structural and 
strategic pressures on the centre, it seems clear that localities and local authorities will have 
to bear the burden of re-igniting the debate and mobilizing any localist movement.  They 
must rediscover a „sense of powerfulness‟ (Lyons, 2007: ii) themselves.  Given the 
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dependency culture of locality on centre and the poor standing of local government among 
ministers and public alike, this is a tall order.   But there is no reason why committed localists 
cannot raise demands (including egalitarian demands), expose the limits of centralism and 
agitate in towns and cities using the small spaces and silences in the White Paper to open up 
a more radical agenda.  Doing so may bring them into confrontation with dominant political 
and economic norms. But this is surely the only strategy presently available to those wanting 
to ignite a serious debate about the position of local government as an agent of public power 
in the 21st century and to ensure that a future White Paper nurtures vibrant, autonomous and 
contrarian localities. 
 
____________________ 
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